Saturday, December 7, 2013

Pearl Harbor, Fear, and Internment

To many in the 21st century, the December 7th, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor is merely a date in history. Back then, before radar and long-range all weather aircraft became common entire areas of the oceans near the United States and its territories were complete unknowns. That was what allowed the Japanese Navy to use six aircraft carriers with approximately 400 planes to sink four and significantly damage another four U.S. battleships, with very little forewarning.


Capsized USS Oklahoma next to damaged USS Maryland
I wholeheartedly believe that the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II was illegal and unconstitutional.  And I feel that some like the Mayor of Los Angeles Fletcher Bowron, the Attorney General for California (and future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court)Earl Warren, and Army General John DeWitt obviously played up on fears and latent racism among the American public at large.

However, not all fears of Americans at the time were based solely on racism.  The American public sided strongly with China when Japan invaded that country in 1937. That was a large reason for oil and iron embargoes the United States imposed on Japan on the months before Pearl Harbor, which gave Japan the pretext for an attack on the United States.

In addition, four years earlier, international news services covered the Japanese conquest of Nanjing (Nanking).  The “Rape of Nanking” in December 1937 saw roughly 200,000 Chinese people murdered and an estimated 20-80,000 women raped in a three month period after the Imperial Japanese Army took the city.

Because of naval disarmament treaties the United States Navy could have only 15 battleships in service, with two additional old ones "demilitarized" for target and training use. Eight were in Hawaii at the time of the attack; one more was on the West Coast and the remaining six in the Atlantic.

Immediately after December 1941, there were only two battleships (and three aircraft carriers) in the entire Pacific for the U.S. Navy.  Six of the Pacific fleet’s battleships were out of action for at least two months, some for a lot longer.  In fact, the USS West Virginia and USS California were out of service for two years and another two, the USS Arizona and USS Oklahoma, were completely destroyed. In the 21st century, it is easy to see that the loss of the battleships instead of the carriers was a blessing in disguise.  But the American public in 1941 saw half the entire battleship fleet crippled at Pearl Harbor; while the Japanese lost only 27 aircraft and five mini-subs in the attack. 

At the end of this post I list all the battleships in service when Pearl Harbor occured. An additional list is of the new warships under construction at the time. Please look at the dates of when these ships were repaired or first entered service. Now imagine yourself as an American living in that era. For the last twenty years you have read in the newspaper or saw on the movie reels how the oceangoing strength of the U.S. is measured by the number of these behemoths. Carriers and subs matter as well, but the man or woman on the street believes battleships are a key part of the national defense.

Now you hear on the news that a few hours ago several of theses ships are taken out of the picture. And the nation behind this attack is now on the move all across the Pacific. And you have no idea how many of the ships hit in Hawaii will be back in service. 

One of the battleships that survived Pearl Harbor, the Maryland, was quickly sent back to the West Coast for the first half of 1942 and along with the battleship Colorado served to boost the morale of the American population by being seen very publicly going in and out of major West Coast ports.  Again, imagine the U.S. Navy having to take major assets like a carrier and use them for nothing other than meeting an intense popular demand:  We want to see our Navy protecting us!

And in the months following Pearl Harbor, the American public also saw in the news the fall of American territories all across the Pacific: The Philippines, Guam in the Marianas Islands, Wake Island, Corregidor, and the “Death March” of the survivors of Bataan in the Philippines. Thousands of American and Filipinos would die in the next few months, and thousands more taken prisoner by Japanese forces.  Britain in the Pacific also suffered huge losses at this time: Two battleships sunk at sea three days after Pearl Harbor and the fall of their important stronghold at Singapore.

The equivalent today would be an attack that crippled or sunk five of the ten Nimitz class aircraft carriers in commission right now. Followed up by American units being attacked in different parts of the world the next day. I believe it was a very bleak period in American history, worse than 9/11. One would have to go back to 1863 to find as difficult a time in our history.

As someone who is familiar with the history of the Pacific War, I feel some today are painting a much darker picture of Americans back then and their inclinations in 1942-5 than is warranted.  I believe that in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor the country was struggling to come to grips with December 7th and its implications. Before the attack on Pearl a sizeable minority of Americans felt that if the U.S. stayed out of war in Europe the country would be fine. Within a matter of days, that worldview was turned on its ear; with war erupting against the United States not in the Atlantic, where some expected, but in Hawaii, at the time a relative backwater. We now had a two-ocean war and were down eight battleships when President Roosevelt asked the Congress to declare war the next day on December 8th.

Some took advantage of the situation to justify their latent bigotry.  Others truly felt an invasion of the West Coast was possible, if not imminent.  And with Nanking and later Bataan in their minds any sense of security was reduced, dramatically.  Whether it was justified or not, many Californians thought a “Nanking” in L.A. was very possible.

Throw into that mix of fear and racism a Japanese submarine surfacing and bombarding an oil field in Santa Barbara in February 1942.  Think about it:  Just three months after Pearl Harbor an enemy submarine feels safe enough to surface and attack an oil well 100 miles up the coast from Los Angeles.  Again, in 2013 we know this was the high-water mark of Japanese naval operations near the West Coast; within months the Japanese Navy would be focused on capturing Guadalcanal and the southwestern Pacific.  But no one knew that at the time, including the sub’s crew.  People in California thought Japanese troop ships and aircraft carriers would show up on the horizon, with no warning, as at Pearl Harbor.

To repeat: I feel the wholesale round-up and internment of all Americans of Japanese descent was/is unjustified.  But even the most open-minded Americans in early 1942 had to wonder what might happen in the next couple of years.  In that light, it is not as inconceivable to see them accepting or even demanding internment. And the internment of Americans was not limited to the West Coast: 11,000 German and 2,000 Italian “aliens” were interned at the same time on the East Coast.



Battleship                           Status day after attack

Oklahoma                           Total loss

Arizona                                Total loss

Maryland                            2 months to repair           February 1942

Tennessee                          2 months to repair           February 1942

Pennsylvania                      4 months to repair           March 1942

Nevada                               10 months to repair        October 1942

California                             2 years to repair               January 1944

West Virginia                      2 and a half years             July 1944

Colorado                              Washington State

New Mexico                        Norfolk, Virginia

Mississippi                          Iceland, arrived at San Francisco Jan. 31, 1942

Idaho                                    Iceland, arrived at San Francisco Jan. 31, 1942

Texas                                    Casco Bay, Maine

New York                             Major shipyard upgrade on East Coast until January 1942

Arkansas                              Casco Bay, Maine



 
New battleships                 Status day after attack
North Carolina                    East Coast - Not ready until March 1942. Arrived in California in June
Washington                         East Coast - Not ready until March 1942. Sent to Europe
South Dakota                      Commissioned March 20, 1942. Arrived in Pacific September, 1942
Indiana                                 Commissioned April 30, 1942. Arrived in Pacific November 1942
Massachusetts                    Commissioned May 12, 1942. Arrived in Europe November, 1942
Alabama                               Commissioned August 16, 1942. Arrived in Europe March, 1943
Iowa                                      Commissioned February 22, 1943.
New Jersey                          Commissioned May 22, 1943.
Wisconsin                            Commissioned April 16, 1944

Missouri                               Commissioned June 11, 1944

Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Marine Detachments

I am proud to say that this article appeared in the November 2013 issue of the United States Naval Institute publication Proceedings.


http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-11/nobody-asked-me-reinstate-mardets

Nobody Asked Me But . . .  Reinstate MarDets

The Navy and Marine Corps are beginning to focus on the Pacific and China. Additionally, within the Corps there is a belief that throughout the last decade, the Marines have become “a second land army” to the detriment of the Service’s core capability of amphibious operations. How should the Marine Corps go forward post-Iraq/Afghanistan and refocus on the sea in this Pacific century? 

One way to return some capability to the Fleet is to reinstate the Marine Detachments (MarDets). Until the 1990’s, Marines were regular components of cruiser, battleship and aircraft carrier crews. These detachments have a history dating back to the very beginnings of the Navy and Marine Corps during the Revolutionary War and on early warships like the USS Constitution. 

During the Cold War, detachments usually consisted of two officers with 35 to 44 enlisted Marines on cruisers and battleships or two officers with 46 to 64 enlisted Marines on carriers. By the late 1990’s, budget and manpower constraints had reduced these numbers on carriers by half. Ultimately, MarDets were eliminated altogether.
 
At the time, the regulations for the Detachments were: “To provide for operations ashore, as a part of the ships landing force; or as a part of the landing force of Marines from ships of the fleet or subdivision thereof; or as an independent force for limited operations.” Doesn't this sound like a valuable asset to us in the present day? 

Unlike what was done on the USS Roosevelt in 1993, when that carrier deployed with a full company of 200 Marines and a transport squadron of ten helicopters plus another 250 support Marines, present day MarDets would have no major impact on carrier operations. No strike aircraft would have to be beached like in 1993 and transport would be by the MH-60S Knighthawk, a good surrogate for the Marines’ UH-1Y and already integrated within the carrier air wing. Current plans call for half a dozen Knighthawks to be in a Carrier Strike Group, enough to transport all of the Leathernecks in one flight. 

Although I never served on an aircraft carrier, Marines I knew who had been part of Cold War style MarDets talked of how they worked with the crews of the SH-3s (and later SH-60s) on all types of insertions including on land, on ships, at night, and in bad weather. These roles of hostile ship-boarding and raiding are tailor-made for Marines. This would also ease up demand on already stretched thin Special Operations and amphibious ships. 

I believe the MarDets could be placed on cruisers again as well. The concept can even be extended to support ships such as the Lewis and Clark class. Whether as a permanent addition or on an as needed basis, a smaller contingent of one officer and twenty enlisted Marines would add to the flexibility of the ship whatever the mission, such as when a ship is deploying to the Indian Ocean to deal with pirates. 

Each of the cruisers and larger support ships like the T-AKE in naval service can operate two MH-60 helicopters; that's enough for a small MarDet to be carried in one lift. 

A CSG under this plan with a carrier and two other ships carrying MarDets would have over 100 Marines fully integrated into the force. MH-60s organic to the group would provide airlift. Any tasking more than the CSG’s Marines could handle might be brought in by an amphibious ship. The Marines would be a small enough unit to get in and out quickly and would have naval gunfire, MH-60R Romeo, and F-18s to provide the support needed during their brief time ashore. For small unit operation, a CSG with a MarDet would be just right, without having to wait for a MEU that might be engaged somewhere else. 

By putting Marines on more ships, we have a much better time-critical response in the Fleet. It also emphasizes small unit operations and leadership at the lowest levels for lieutenants and non-commissioned officers. This idea will help the Corps transition from a land army mentality back to its maritime nature much more quickly. 

And by using the MH-60 we take advantage of the platform's all-weather performance and the ability to operate precision ordnance like the Hellfire missile, something earlier Navy helicopters like the  SH-3 lacked. Yet they remain able to conduct traditional naval missions like sea control. 

I like the idea of bringing back the MarDets. They are a treasured part of Navy and Marine history, and I believe they can be part of the "Pacific pivot" and the Marine Corps’ future.

Bibliography

The Naval Institute Guide To The Ships And Aircraft Of The U.S. Fleet Norman Polmar 18th edition 2005

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/corps%20salty%20dogs.htm